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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the impact of World Bank development policies on water shortages
in the Middle East and North Africa. Analyzing primary sources from the World Bank Group
Archives, I contend that in funding water development projects in the 1960s and 1970s the World
Bank and its subsidiaries, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the
International Development Association, created economic disincentives to water conservation.
These disincentives likely made authorities unable to effectively respond to water shortages that
developed in the latter half of the 20th century. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is used as a
case study, which I argue illuminates active World Bank economic disincentive policies that were
enacted throughout the MENA region.
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I.

Introduction
This thesis examines the impact of World Bank funded development projects on water

resources in the Middle East and North Africa. I argue that the water systems financed and
developed by the World Bank and its subsidiary organizations, the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA),
were established with economic disincentives to water conservation. I argue that these economic
disincentives have been a contributing factor to the ongoing water crisis in the region by making
authorities unable to effectively respond to shortages. I use the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan as
a case study to understand these larger phenomena. As one of the largest recipients of World Bank
financing for water projects, with some of the most significant examples of water infrastructure
development by the World Bank, Jordan is well suited to illustrate the World Bank’s development
practices. This thesis primarily focuses on the 1960s and 1970s, with background taken from the
Bank’s preliminary work in the 1950s.

Why Water?
It is said that in 1985, the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs and future Secretary General
of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali warned “The next war in the Middle East will be
fought over water, not politics”. World Bank Vice President Isamil Serageldin (1992-2000)
reiterated this sentiment more broadly ten years later saying “The wars of this century have been
on oil, and the wars of the next century will be on water unless we change the ways we manage

1

water.”1 This warning has been repeated so frequently when speculating on the future of the Middle
East and North Africa that it has become cliche. In a 1991 Foreign Policy article, Joyce Starr drew
comparisons between the invasion of Kuwait over slant drilling into Iraqi oil reserves to a potential
future war over aquifer drilling.2 In a 2002 article, Hussein Amery claimed that Lebanon’s
construction of a pumping station on the Wazzani Spring in 2001 nearly triggered a military
response from Israel.3 Considering the water scarcity, the growing population, and the highlypublicized military engagements of the 20th century in the region, the idea of a Middle Eastern
water war is a fairly straightforward prediction. Although common, his water war narrative is
largely an exaggerated concern. The next war in the Middle East was fought, and it was not over
water. Recently discussion has pushed back on this narrative, with many scholars arguing water
shortages will drive cooperation not conflict.4 The water war proclamations may be exaggerated,
but they do illustrate a real concern for the region.
In a 2019 analysis of their Aqueduct Database, the World Resources Institute ranked Jordan
as the fifth-most water stressed state in the world.5 The United Nations’ Food and Agricultural
Organization’s AQUASTAT database indicates that total renewable water resources per capita
have sharply declined from 235.6 m3/inhab/year in 1992 to 95.75 m3/inhab/year in 2017. 6 The
2019 Water Budget report from the Jordanian Ministry of Water and Irrigation acknowledges that
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Jordan is one of the most water poor countries on earth. The Ministry attributes its water shortages
to its arid climate, low rainfall, increased population, and its position in a transnational water basin
where water resources must be shared with both Syria and Israel.7 Several policy briefs from the
Ministry reiterate the extent of the water shortage and the need for rapid response. A 2016 brief
outlines the need for an extensive response to the water crisis because of predicted strain from
climate change.8 How can Jordan or the other water-poor states of the MENA address scarcity at
this scale? Several strategies have been utilized or suggested to mitigate the water shortages of the
region. Virtual water imports have been used extensively, but studies show that these are politically
hazardous.9 Desalination is a common suggestion, however the cost and energy intensity of the
process have prevented large-scale implementation of this strategy.10 Researchers and government
officials alike point to the need to curb user demand.11
Yet, I argue that there is an oversight in this quest to find solutions to the water security
question in the Middle East and North Africa. The literature fails to consider the historic roots of
excessive water demand in the region. Population growth is blamed for excessive demand,
however, researchers have paid little attention to the underlying water system of the Middle East
and the international forces which helped shape them. Historicising the water crisis and examining
the development of water systems could provide insights into the cause of the shortage. This thesis
will examine the development of Jordan’s water infrastructure, and the economics that were

7

Directorate of Policies and Strategic Planning, “Al Mwaznt al Mayy 2019” (Ministry of Water and Irrigation,
2019).
8
“Siasat Sina’ al Muneat Limuajahat ’athar al Taghayur al Munakhii Ealaa Qitae al Miah” (Ministry of Water and
Irrigation, 2016).
9
Marta Antonelli and Stefania Tamea, “Food-Water Security and Virtual Water Trade in the Middle East and North
Africa,” International Journal of Water Resources Development 31, no. 3 (2015): 326–42.
10
Mousa S. Mohsen, “Water Strategies and Potential of Desalination in Jordan,” Desalination 203, no. 1–3 (2007):
27–46.
11
Joep F. Schyns et al., “Mitigating the Risk of Extreme Water Scarcity and Dependency: The Case of Jordan,”
Water 7, no. 10 (2015): 5705–30.

3

established at its inception. In particular, I examine World Bank development projects which
formed a significant portion of Jordan’s early infrastructure. This will bring to light factors that
contribute to the Kingdom’s water problems.

Discussion of Primary Sources
The bulk of the primary sources for this project are internal documents from the World
Bank’s archives. Within the last ten years, the Bank has disclosed and digitized a significant
number of sector economic reports, staff appraisal reports, memoranda and recommendations to
the president dealing with their activities in Jordan and the rest of the Middle East and North
Africa. The Bank has additionally disclosed key documents that hint at the organizational culture
that may be obscured in the purely technical and economic documents, including speech
collections and the internal, secretary-compiled newsletter International Bank Notes. Staff
appraisal reports constitute the greatest source of evidence for this thesis, with sector economic
reports and memoranda and recommendations enhancing the discussion of the Bank’s activities in
the country and larger region. Internal speeches and newsletters are used to create a more complete
picture of the Bank’s approach to development in the region, as they hint at the Bank staff’s
perceptions of the states and peoples with which they worked.

4

II.

Historiographical Overview
1. Contribution/Intervention
Despite the fact that these World Bank documents detail the establishment of key water

infrastructure and economic systems for water distribution, they are noticeably absent from the
literature surrounding water issues in the Kingdom. Even literature addressing the Bank’s role in
Jordanian development more broadly neglects this period and document set, and the secondary
sources almost entirely fall outside historical analysis. Harrigan, El-Said, and Wang considered
the roles of the IMF and the World Bank in Jordan, however, they focused only on the “economic
liberalization program” era since 1989, much later than the scope of this thesis and do not consider
their role in water.12 Michael Goldman considers the role of the World Bank in water policy, but
only in a later era, and with little consideration of their impact in the Middle East and North
Africa.13
In 2013 (submitted in March 2011, published in 2013) Karen Bakker, an interdisciplinary
water governance researcher, authored a historical analysis of the World Bank’s policies on urban
water supply networks from the 1960s to the 1980s, addressing some of the issues of Bank policy
present in this thesis.14 This work, however, focuses less on water supply constraints or
conservation, and instead makes more general, global arguments about the emergence of “state
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failure” arguments in the 1980s and 1990s. She argues that rather than focusing on the
failings of governments, scholars are better served by analyzing the flaws in particular models of
development-- in her case those models pushed by the World Bank. She further contends, as I do
in this thesis, that historical analysis of policy is relevant to contemporary debates over water
issues.15 Her contribution is likely the most similar to this thesis in the literature, but I build on
her contributions by focusing specifically on a flaw in the World Bank’s development models. In
particular I focus on the theme of economic disincentives to water conservation. Additionally, I
have found sources which conflict with Bakker’s timeline. Her argument is predicated on
assumptions about World Bank funding activities during the 1960s, which more recent sources
show to be incorrect. Specifically, her timeline relies on the World Bank only providing loans for
two water projects between 1961 and 1970.16 Bakker argues that the 1970s brought about a shift
in the World Bank’s activities, however, the First Amman Water Supply Project and the Four
Cities Water Supply projects discussed in my thesis show that the Bank was active in funding
development projects in the 1960s. My analysis of the World Bank sources complicates her
narrative, showing that the Bank’s activities in the 1970s were the continuation of their operations
in the 1960s. It is likely that Bakker’s work was based on World Bank documents which were
released before the set used in this thesis. I argue that the World Bank’s reach in the Middle East
and North Africa, its operations and its ability to inform policy, began in the 1950s and extended
through the contemporary period.
The World Bank’s website keeps track of total downloads of the available documents, and
those numbers show that many of the sources used in this theses have been digitally accessed quite

15
16
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rarely. The appraisal of the first Amman Water Supply Project has only been downloaded a total
of 127 times, the 1954 sector report detailing the anticipated role of the Bank in Jordan has only
been viewed 145 times, and many of the Bank’s newsletter have been downloaded less than 100
times. While download numbers, of course, do not alone indicate these documents’ absence in the
literature surrounding water in Jordan or in the regional context, to the best of my knowledge, they
have yet to be considered by historians to understand the water challenges faced by Jordan.

2. World Bank Historiography
Much of the literature concerning the intersection of World Bank development projects
and water resource allocation deals with a later period than the focus of this project. While the
First Amman Water supply project began in 1961, much of the literature focuses on the World
Bank after it experienced a major transformation of its goals in the 1970s. Michael Goldman argues
that the World Bank expanded its scope and began a program of “green neoliberalism” (especially
to water supply projects) in the 1970s after former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
was selected as the new president of the Bank. Goldman makes the argument that the frameworks
laid down by McNamara, rather than the earlier, cautious developmentalism of the World Bank,
focused on poverty alleviation and would serve as the basis for large scale water privatization in
the Global South.17 Both Goldman and Bakker consider themes relevant to the discussion of the
World Bank’s development policies, however, this thesis complicates their narratives. Goldman
and Bakker argue that the 1970s and the tenure of McNamara brought about a shift in the World
Bank’s operations. This thesis, however, challenges this argument by taking a long view of the

17
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World Bank’s operations. It finds that the themes referenced by Bakker and Goldman are strongly
rooted in the World Bank’s policies of the 1950s and 1960s.

3. Middle East Environmental Historiography
Environmental history of the Middle East is a relatively new field, but one that has seen
significant interest in the recent years. It is a common misconception, especially in the West, to
view the Middle East and North Africa as an undeveloped desert wasteland. Misperceptions of the
physical environment of the Middle East have led to dangerous misperceptions of the peoples of
the Middle East and have given rise to harmful thinking towards them. Common throughout
orientalist thought on the MENA is the idea of environmental determinism— that is the belief that
there is something inherent in the environment of the Middle East which inevitably doom the
people to collapse and eventual subservience to the West. In a 2010 roundtable published in the
International Journal of Middle East Studies, Diana Davis warns of the dangers of such thinking
emerging in environmental histories of the Middle East and North Africa. 18 Other scholarship on
the physical environment of the MENA has described a constant struggle between man and
environment in which humans have little agency. In recent years, new scholarship has emerged in
the academy of Middle East studies which recognizes the need to study the environment of the
Middle East and North Africa to fill the gaps in our knowledge.
One of the best efforts to fill this gap in the field comes from Water on Sand:
Environmental Histories of the Middle East and North Africa.19 This collection of eleven essays,
published in 2013, serves as a demonstration of the necessity of integrating environmental history

18

Diana K. Davis, 2010. “Power, Knowledge, and Environmental History in the Middle East and North Africa.”
International Journal of Middle East Studies 42 (4): 657–59.
19
Alan Mikhail, 2013. Water on Sand: Environmental Histories of the Middle East and North Africa. Book, Whole.
US: Oxford University Press.
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into Middle East studies and, likewise, to integrate Middle East studies into environmental history.
In his introduction, editor Alan Mikhail assess the current state of the relationship between Middle
East studies and environmental history. He argues that modern Middle East studies has regularly
borrowed and innovated techniques and methodologies from the historiographies of other fields,
but until recent years has largely failed to utilize methodologies of environmental history. 20 The
emerging scholarship of Middle East environmental history builds off of existing methodology
from other regional studies of the environment. Taking the perspectives of environmental history
would add additional depth to current debates within Middle East studies. Environmental history
would fill in the gaps of actors key to the region’s history, but remain missing from the literature
such as animals, microbes, water, or oil.

21

Likewise, Mikhail argues it could allow for fresh

examination of issues such as imperial decline, the end of the colonial era, and the role of oil in
20th century politics.
Mikhail further argues neglect of the Middle East leaves gaps in the larger understanding
of environmental history. Without integration of environmental histories of the Middle East into
the larger global environmental historiography, researchers and historians have only a piece of the
story. For example, Mikhail argues that it is commonly thought (because of European and East
Asian sources) that the Middle Ages was a period of global warming, however, contemporary
Persian and Arabic sources from Iran indicate that the Middle East was experiencing a period of
chilling.22 Environmental histories could further benefit from an enormous number of sources
which are the result of robust state systems that create a documentary record far longer than most

20
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other parts of the world.

23

It is likely that this thesis’ examination of economic disincentives to

conservation in the Middle East could contribute to the wider conversation surrounding the
historiography of resource usage.
As is to be expected, several of the essays in Water on Sand examine current water issues
in the Middle East and North Africa. In “Building the Past: Rockscapes and the Aswan High Dam
in Egypt,” Nancy Reynolds utilizes geology to add additional depth to discussions to one of the
largest hydrological projects in the modern MENA.24 By examining the geology of the dam site,
Reynolds links the dam project to a history of works projects in the country and how Nasser used
the project in his postcolonial nationalism efforts. In “State of Nature: The Politics of Water in the
Making of Saudi Arabia,” Toby Jones uses an impressive collection of primary governmental and
nongovernmental sources to examine the supremacy of water in the building of the Saudi
kingdom.25 Rather than simply putting oil at the center of the story as often happens in studies of
Saudi Arabia, Jones expands on existing scholarship to show how the scarcity of water shaped
modern Saudi politics and international relations.
My thesis will contribute to this growing body of literature by incorporating the role of
International Organizations into the narrative surrounding water and resource shortages.
International Organizations like the World Bank, the United Nations, and state-sponsored
development agencies have played a major role in shaping the Middle East and North Africa in
the 20th century and beyond. Their policies, philosophies, and funds are inextricably linked to the
region’s infrastructure today. Despite the significant role the World Bank played in shaping the
environment of the Modern Middle East its role has not been examined by environmental

23
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historians of the Modern Middle East. Unlike many environmental histories, this thesis does not
delve into specific scientific analysis. Rather, I contribute to the field of environmental history by
showing the economic factors which contribute to resource crises.

4. Cold War Historiography
The World Bank’s operations in Jordan were conducted with the backdrop of the Cold War
shaping global politics. While the World Bank is a nongovernmental organization, it is important
to consider the ways this Cold War backdrop shaped the way states and international organizations
interact with the environment. There is a growing body of literature in environmental history which
considers just that. A recurring theme in this literature is that the need to counter Soviet
international influence often trumped environmental preservation or conservation. Christopher
Sneddon argues that the United States government deployed the Bureau of Reclamation across
Latin America, Asia, and Africa during the Cold War. They were tasked with developing large
damming projects (often at the cost of the environment) as a way to sow goodwill towards the
United States in opposition to the USSR.26 In All the Boats on the Ocean, Carmel Finley argues
that the unsustainable fishing practices of today and the decline of global fisheries originated from
the tensions between the USSR and the US. She argues that the United States subsidized the
construction of bigger fishing fleets to compete with Soviet Fleets, and created fishing rights
concessions to bolster loyalty from key allies. The Soviets countered with their own increased
fishing, and in essence created a “fish race” between the two powers. 27 This competition between
the US and the USSR and its consequential environmental degradation yielded some interesting

26

Christopher Sneddon, Concrete Revolution: Large Dams, Cold War Geopolitics, and the US Bureau of
Reclamation, Book, Whole (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2015).
27
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results. Jacob Hamblin argues that much of the modern environmental movement in the United
States originates from the Cold War. In Arming Mother Nature, he finds that American scientists
tasked with military research in the Cold War were awakened to the possibility of environmental
decline from human action. He argues that those scientists who were tasked with researching
nuclear warfare, climate manipulation, or the development of chemical weapons would go on to
form the catastrophic environmentalism movement of the 1970s.28 I propose to use this
historiography to demonstrate the pressures of this global tension on local environments, and
extend their arguments into the ways the World Bank exercised its influence on Jordan.

28

Jacob Darwin Hamblin, Arming Mother Nature: The Birth of Catastrophic Environmentalism, Book, Whole (US:
Oxford University Press, 2013).
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III.

Historical Background

1. The World Bank
On 1 July 1944, delegates from forty-four countries met at the Mount Washington Hotel in
Bretton Woods, New Hampshire for the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference. Over
a twenty-two day period, these delegates roadmapped the anticipated plans for the international
economic system for the postwar period. The International Monetary Fund and the International
Bank For Reconstruction and Development (which would evolve into the World Bank) emerged
from the conference, ready to respond to the impending economic challenges brought on by the
end of the Second World War. The IBRD, initially conceived by delegates to reconstruct existing
systems in countries devastated by the war, quickly shifted to providing development loans and
assistance to states around the world. Reflecting on the Bank’s history, Raymond Mikesell, a
technical staffer at the Bretton Woods conference, argued that by 1957 the World Bank became
concerned about its members’ ability to service their loans.

29

In response, the International

Development Association, an affiliate of the Bank, was inaugurated in 1960 as a project-lending
institution. The IDA had greater flexibility in its lending criteria, allowing loans to be made in
situations where the Bank was less optimistic about the debtor’s ability to repay.

29

Raymond Mikesell, “The Emergence of the World Bank as a Development Institution,” in Bretton Woods
Revisited: Evaluations of the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (University of Toronto Press, 1972).
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2. The World Bank in Jordan
In the earliest years of the bank, Jordan was on the fringes of the IBRD’s attention. The
IBRD’s 1948 assessment of trade in the Middle East mentions Jordan only three times-- twice in
footnotes.30 A 1949 report detailing a series of discussions between the IBRD and representatives
from the British Foreign Office on potential development projects in the former British holdings
in the Middle East shows the IBRD had only secondary interest in the Jordanian projects proposed
by the delegation. The IBRD noted in particular that projects in Jordan would not be eligible for
funding as the Kingdom was not yet a member of the bank. 31
The IBRD’s interest in Jordan grew over the next two years as the Bank produced a
preliminary report, Development Prospects in Jordan, in 1951.

32

The report details the IBRD’s

concern over the recent population explosion of Jordan brought on by the incorporation of Arab
Palestine (i.e. the West Bank) and Palestinian refugees from territories now held by Israel. The
former population of Transjordan was 490,000, but Jordan now incorporated 450,000 people in
Arab Palestine and 350,000 refugees. The report found that Jordan was incapable of producing
enough goods to supply the needs of the population, and argued that the situation could only be
improved if resources were developed to supply more food for local consumption or if commodity
production for export was increased to allow for greater external trade. The 1949 report and 1951
report both noted that the development prospects of Jordan were limited. The 1951 report’s initial
findings noted the possibility of increasing agricultural production and developing mineral

30

Alexander Stevenson, “Trade of the Middle East” (International Bank For Reconstruction and Development,
April 6, 1948).
31
F. G. Bochenski, “British Development Proposals for the Middle East” (International Bank For Reconstruction
and Development, December 12, 1949).
32
A Basch, “Development Prospects in Jordan” (International Bank For Reconstruction and Development, June 25,
1951).
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extraction and industrial production. It is against this backdrop that one needs to consider the
policies implemented by the World Bank and their impact on water resources.
The IBRD’s relationship with Jordan shifted in 1952 when the Kingdom was admitted as
the 54th member of the Bank. 33 Earlier that year, F. G. Bochenski became the first staff person of
the Bank to travel to Jordan, noting the potential for a brighter economic future if development
projects (mineral extraction, Yarmouk River irrigation project, etc.) received funding.

34

In 1954,

the Jordanian government expressed an interest in a survey mission from the IBRD. Largely
relying on data gathered from other entities and supplemented by a few short visits to Jordan by
Bank personnel between 1952 and 1954, the IBRD produced the 1954 report Development
Problems of Jordan and the Role of the Bank.

35

The report states that the goal of development

projects in Jordan should be to increase the standard of living of the existing population and, if
possible, to further integration of the refugee population into the Jordanian economy. The
development prospects were largely categorized into three economic objectives: increase
agricultural output, develop mineral extraction and light industry, and improve transportation
infrastructure.
The World Bank’s early interactions with the Hashemite Kingdom culminated in 1957 with
The Economic Development of Jordan. This expansive volume reports on an IBRD mission to
Jordan which occurred in 1955. The mission consisted of a significant number of field experts who
studied the state of the country and potential areas for development. The report served as a roadmap

33

Press Release, “Announcement That the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan Became a Member of the
International Monetary Fund and the Bank on August 29, 1952” (International Bank For Reconstruction and
Development, August 29, 1952).
34
F. G. Bochenski, “International Bank Notes (Vol. 6, No. 10)” (International Bank For Reconstruction and
Development, October 1, 1952).
35
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for World Bank involvement in the Kingdom, covering recommendations for developing
everything from agriculture to transportation, as well as areas like education and healthcare.
World Bank Staff in Jordan
When examining the World Bank’s activities in Jordan, it is worthwhile to consider the
staffers who were part of the planning and implementation of development projects. The
perception of a region can impact the way a group responds to the issues faced by a region. Diana
Davis has cautioned against environmental determinism seeking into environmental histories of
the Middle East and North Africa. Likewise, it is beneficial to understand how such beliefs may
have impacted historic actors interacting with the region. Simply examining the main body of
primary sources in this thesis, however, would provide only hints at the author’s underlying
perceptions of the Middle East and North Africa. These project appraisal documents, while
evidencing the economic disincentives at the heart of my argument, use cautious, technical
language. A much better picture of the Bank employee’s perceptions and beliefs about the region
can be found in speeches given by staff and by the Bank’s internal newsletter, International Bank
Notes.

16

Figure 1: Bochenski’s 1952 Photographs Printed in International Bank Notes36

In October 1952, Feliks Bochenski, an officer of the IBRD who was deeply involved in the
Bank’s early activities in the Middle East published an account of his visit to Jordan in
International Bank Notes.37 Jordan had become the 54th member of the Bank in August of that
same year, and according to the editor’s notes, Bochenski was the first Bank staffer to visit the
Kingdom. Bochenski largely characterized Jordan along its development issues, laying out the
challenges faced by the Kingdom in the years following the 1948 War with Israel. He referenced
the belief that Transjordan had largely been a “hinterland” of Palestine, and expressed that “it is
obvious that a country where conditions were never easy and have become completely abnormal
must depend to a large extent on foreign aid.” He praised the Jordanians that he encountered,
noting that they were “thoroughly and genuinely friendly to foreigners” and that “the dominating
general impression is one of order, punctuality and hard work against unbelievable odds.” While
Bochenski seems to be referencing the Jordanianians and Palestinian refugees in a paternalistic
tone, it is notable that he attributes to the challenges faced by the Kingdom as a resource issue,

36
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rather than a value jugement about an environmental inevitability. While the literature shows that
historically the West has interacted with the environments of the Middle East and North Africa
through the lense of environmental determinism, Bochenski’s writing evidences a different
attitude. Bochenski does not see the challenges of the region as a product of a people damaged by
a harsh environment-- he sees them as an issue of economics.
In December 1954, Bochenski addressed a study group of the Bank on the role of the IBRD
in the economic development of the Middle East. It appears that this speech was given behind
closed doors, and it is likely that Bochenski spoke without concern of appeasing the Middle East
governments which he discussed. Bochenski’s transcript was not disclosed by the Bank archives
until 2013. The speech, of course, provides an interesting assessment of the practical step the Bank
believed it must take to assist in the economic development of the Middle East. Perhaps more
interestingly, though, is that his speech hints at the way the region was perceived by the bank.
Bochenski acknowledges that the common perception of the Middle East is that it is
“undeveloped” or “underdeveloped.”38 While he points out that the per capita income for the six
countries to which he refers (Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt) is low compared to
other regions of the world, he adds surprising nuance to his assessment. He points out that groups
in the Middle East would argue that “they are undeveloped only in a purely materialistic sense of
the word.”39 Bochenski states that the Lebanese would point to their ancient pasts and their
contemporary links to Western culture and the Egyptians would point towards their success in
agriculture to rebut these perceptions. Bochenski expresses his praise that the countries under
discussion do not have any “strong socialistic or etatistique tendencies'' and that “There is a rather
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general respect for commercial and financial obligations.”40 While his assessment of the Arabs
and Iranians in question, of course, have orientalist overtones, they demonstrate a more
complicated perception of the region than one might expect in the post-colonial era. Though a
strict adherent to environmental determinism might argue the “under” or “undeveloped” economy
of the Middle East was some sort of flaw with the peoples of the region, Bochenski instead
characterizes the perceived deficiencies in simple economic terms. “Underdevelopment” of the
region is the result of “an unfavorable ratio of people to existing economic resources.”41

3. Economic Disincentives to Conservation
The early World Bank reports show that as the Bank designed and funded development
projects in Jordan, they acted with the goal of supporting economic development of the Kingdom
and increasing foreign exchange.42 This need shaped the way they perceived the landscape of
Jordan and its resources. A chief concern throughout the earliest reports was to increase exports to
close the foreign trade gap. Development Prospects in Jordan made the case that development
potentialities were limited for the Kingdom, but the Bank saw the possibilities in the mountains,
deserts, and valleys of Jordan. The Bank argued that more fully utilizing the waters of the Yarmouk
and Jordan rivers could allow for irrigation programs to increase agricultural production.43 The
1954 report, echoed these visions arguing that range water spreading, better seeds and fertilizers,
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and increased terracing of the mountain slopes could result in greater economic output by the
Kingdom. 44 The Economic Development of Jordan argued for the same uses, but went into more
specificity, seeing the greatest potential in the Jordan Valley.

45

Analyzing these reports makes it

clear that the World Bank understood the future economic development of Jordan as inextricably
linked to the development of its water resources. This link, however, is missing from the
historiography of Jordan and is a contribution of this thesis to our historical knowledge.
The need for economic development inevitably drove the way the World Bank approached
development projects in the country. In 1961, when the International Development Association
completed its internal Appraisal of the Amman Water Supply Project, the group justified funding
the plan with the rationalization that expansion of the water supply project (after initial investment)
could be sustained through water revenues.46 In effect, the World Bank designed a system where
expansion could only come from usage. In essence, water authorities now had an economic
disincentive to conservation. Regardless of the need for a reduction in water usage-- from drought,
from climate change-- water authorities were disincentivized from encouraging reductions because
a loss of revenue may cause the authority to operate at a loss.
Water systems in many countries have operated in this fashion prompting consideration
from economists and other scholars (though neglected by historians). Janice Beecher notes that:
The disincentive for water utilities to promote conservation appears to be strong. Traditional economic
regulation tends to reinforce the disincentive for utility-sponsored conservation. Regulated utilities generally
are more motivated to invest in supply-side resources and increase sales than to· engage in demand
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management. Reductions in utility sales through conservation can cause revenue erosion and uncertainty,
which in turn can reduce profits to investors and increase perceived risks. 47

In the context of responding to climate change, Douglas Kenny, a water policy expert, argues that
water authority conservation efforts, while politically challenging, is a viable strategy to respond
to increasing water shortages.48 He reiterates, however, Beecher’s argument that utilities are
disincentives from water conservation because of the economic system in which they operate. “If
less water is sold, then revenues drop.”49 As utility costs are fixed, conservation can lead to
budgetary shortfalls that can only be resolved by rate increases which can be politically
problematic. Kenny acknowledges that these sorts of disincentives are present in many utility
sectors, but emphasizes that these “throughput incentives for water utilities” has rarely been
addressed by revenue model reforms.50
While this concept has been considered in water management journals and by
conservationists, the historiography surrounding water shortages in the Middle East have failed to
take it into account. To address the issue of water scarcity in the MENA, this thesis will use Jordan
as a case study to show that water infrastructure planned and funded by the World Bank created
economic disincentives to conservation. I analyze three major water supply projects in Jordan
which I argue evidence the World Bank’s role in creating economic disincentives to water
conservation.
The first is the 1961 Amman Water Supply Project. This was the first development project
funded by the Bank and illustrates the economics system which demonstrates these disincentives.
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The next is a group of projects, collectively referred to as the Four Cities Water Supply Projects
from 1963. In particular, I focus on the Irbid-Azraq and the Zarqa water projects, which evidence
that the World Bank’s use of this particular type of water economics was not limited to Amman.
In 1973, the World Bank financed a second Water Supply project. It demonstrates the longevity
of the water economics model used by the Bank which created economic disincentives to
conservation in the early 1960. This complicates the narrative which implies that the World Bank’s
approach to water economics dramatically shifted to a new approach during Robert McNamara’s
tenure as Bank President. Secondary evidence for this project comes from The Hussein Thermal
Power Project in 1973, and the 1968 National Water Supply Project in Tunisia. The power project
evidences that the World Bank applied similar economic models to utilities other than water
systems. Finally, the 1968 Tunisian project evidences that the World Bank’s use of this system
was not unique to the Jordanian context, but spread the model throughout the Middle East and
North Africa.
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Figure 2: 1963 IBRD Map of Jordan51
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IV.

World Bank Projects
Figure 3:1961 Signing of the Credit Agreement for the Amman Water Supply Project52

His Excellency Yusuf Haikal, Jordanian Ambassador to the United States (Left) and Sir William Iliff, Vice President of IDA (Right)

1. First Amman Water Supply Project
After the early reports indicated the urgent need of water supply development projects in
Jordan, the International Development Association conducted its appraisal of the first major water
project in the country in 1961. The IDA worked alongside American consultants, Brown Engineers
International of New York, to develop the first Amman Water Supply Project. It would be the first
of many such projects to increase access to water supplies, combat waterborne diseases, and open
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up pathways to economic development. The internal appraisal of the project prepared by the IDA’s
Department of Technical Operations evidences the early establishment of economic disincentives
to conservation in the water-poor Kingdom.
Assessment of Existing System
The appraisal found that the water infrastructure of the capital city was significantly
insufficient for the needs of Amman’s population and economy. Data for the appraisal was
provided in part by the Jordanian government and by a field investigation from the IDA’s staff
and independent consultants. Rapidly growing water demand proved to be a serious concern of the
municipality and the IDA. In 1952, Amman had a population of around 108,000. By 1961, that
figure had grown to 203,000, largely from an influx of refugees from Palestine and from Jordanians
relocating to Amman.53 While this staggering population growth alone would be concerning, per
capita usage was also rising rapidly. Per capita water use had increased in the prior few years at an
average annual rate of 4%. The report also noted that there was significant disparity in water usage
among residents at different economic levels. They found that the existing water supply system
served only around two-thirds of the city's population.54 The remaining third of the population not
served by the municipal system, primarily Palestinian refugees, received their water largely from
private charitable organizations trucking water to refugee camps around the city. 55 Much of the
existing infrastructure was severely outdated. Up until ten years prior to the appraisal, the entirety
of Amman’s water supply was collected from an ancient Roman collection gallery, Ras al Ain.56
This was subsequently supplemented by a spring seven kilometers west of Amman and a series of
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wells. All water supply for the city was treated using simple chlorination, and the report estimated
a total capacity of 620 cubic meters per hour.57 Industrial and commercial establishments in the
city operated around 30 private wells, but the municipality had since prohibited the drilling of new
private wells. The distribution system within the city was largely constructed on a piece by piece
emergency basis, with much of it in poor condition. The IDA noted that water testing facilities
were limited, and routine insufficient capacity in the system allowed for pollution to enter the
supply.58 Coupled with the lack of a public sewerage system, this led to a much higher than average
rate of waterborne diseases. The report also found that leakages and “unaccounted for losses”
amounted to around 39% of the total water output.59
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Figure 4:1961 IBRD Map of the First Amman Water Supply Project60
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Proposed Project
To respond to these challenges, the IDA proposed a major development project to overhaul
the water supply system of Amman. The group indicated that their projections of future demand
were quite speculative due to a lack of statistics, uncertainty about continued immigration, and the
unknown pent-up demand. They designed the project for an estimated municipal population of
360,000 in 1972, planning to increase usage from 35 LPCD (liters per capita per day) to 50 LPCD
in 1972 and finally 83 LPCD in 1987. The project likewise relied on decreasing unaccounted water
loss from 39% to 20% in 1972 and finally 15% in 1987. 61
Much of the planning for this project was done by an American consulting group, Brown
Engineers International of New York, with additional planning provided by Jordan’s Central Water
Authority. They proposed developing new wells and constructing new pumping stations at Wadi
Sir to increase capacity from 620 cubic meters per hour to approximately 1500 meters per hour.
Major improvements and reinforcements would be made to existing transmission and distribution
mains, and reservoir storage capacity would be increased by around 3000 cubic meters. The project
proposed transitioning to superchlorination rather than simple chlorination for water sanitation.62
Superchlorination (or “shock-chlorination”) was a common water sanitation method of the time,
primarily used in instances where long detention periods of water supplies was not possible.63 This
likely would have been a significant improvement to water quality in Amman over the old system.
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Superchlorinating equipment, dechlorinators, retention facilities, and high lift pumps would be
built at Wadi Sir and Ain Ghazal. Water testing labs would be established at both springs, and the
plan provided for additional water treatment facilities if need was demonstrated. The IDA
estimated that construction of the basic facilities could be completed by the end of 1962, and
construction of additional water treatment facilities would require 18 months.
Justification of the Project
The appraisal report recommended proceeding with the proposed plan and providing $2
million of the total estimated cost of $3.05 million. The IDA recognized that emergency measures
taken by the Amman governorate had been inadequate to provide a minimum safe water supply
for the fast growing population. Funding would be provided to ensure water supplies for the
population and to reduce the rate of waterborne disease in the city. Justification for the project
largely mirrored the goals of the World Bank outlined in the 1957 Economic Development of
Jordan and other early reports. The IDA reiterated the potential of Amman to become a tourist
attraction and increase foreign exchange earnings for the country. They believed that a safe and
dependable water supply could increase Amman’s status as a tourist center. While the IDA found
that industrial water usage in the city was at the time insignificant, they partially justified the
project for its potential to attract greater industrial activity to the city. Regardless if this occurred,
they believed existing small-scale commercial establishments would benefit from improved water
service. The IDA’s final justification for the project was that extensions and improvements to the
water supply would bring in revenues to further expansion of the system.
Evidence of Economic Disincentives to Conservation
From an examination of the appraisal, there is evidence that the IDA’s proposed project
would create economic disincentives to water conservation. This project envisioned further
30

expansion of the water supply system to meet ever increasing demand in Amman. The main goal
of the proposed management team was to develop a regular program of extensions and
improvements to the secondary water distribution system. While these expansions would no doubt
be needed, the IDA’s vision for funding them necessitated the creation of an economic system
which required ever expanding water revenues. The IDA projected that earnings from their
proposed water rates would provide substantial funds for this “urgently needed program of
extensions and improvements.”

64

This goal is reiterated several times throughout the appraisal

“Financial projections indicate that adequate funds could be obtained through water revenues to
operate and maintain the expanded system and to carry out a program of extensions and
improvements which would bring public water supply to a larger community.” 65 One of the main
provisions of the agreement between the IDA and the Kingdom of Jordan was that “water rates
will be maintained adequate to cover…the costs of a program of extensions and improvements to
the secondary distribution system as well as a reasonable part of the cost of future major
expansion.” 66 While the goals of furthering water supplies to underserved populations, reducing
the rate of waterborne disease, and expanding economic activities are clearly well intentioned, the
system envisioned by the IDA would have unintended consequences. By creating this revenue
stream for developing expansions to the system, the IDA created a scenario where the water
authority could not encourage conservation of water resources as it would kill their ability to make
necessary improvements.
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2. Four Cities Water Supply Projects
Two years after the IDA appraised the Amman Water Supply Project, the association began
the process of funding a series of water projects in the outlying towns of Jordan. They focused on
four projects to be funded together in Ramallah-El Bira, Azraq-Irbid (service to Irbid, Mafraq,
Ramtha, and Husn), Zarqa, and Nablus (see Figure 2). While all four are significant, the AzraqIrbid and the Zarqa projects are the focus of this analysis as the West Bank would come under
Israeli military occupation after the 1967 war. Although the Jordanian government would not
formally sever its economic and political ties with the West Bank until 1988, it appears that the
World Bank’s activities in the occupied territories ceased in 1967. The 1969 Current Economic
Position and Prospects of Jordan report from the World Bank shows that funding for projects in
the territories had stopped, and seems to indicate that the World Bank had removed the West Bank
from its future development plans in Jordan.67 Further, appraisal reports for World Bank projects
in Israel in the ensuing years stipulate that funded projects were wholly outside the occupied
territories.68 From the documents, the World Bank’s stance on the occupation is unclear. It is,
however, likely that these two documents indicate a neutrality by the World Bank’s leadership
towards a conflict between two of its member states. The fate of the Ramallah-El Bira and Nablus
projects is unclear in the documentation, so they are not considered in this thesis. The goals of the
Azraq-Irbid and Zarqa projects were substantially similar to the Amman project: increase access
to water supplies, reduce waterborne diseases, and open pathways to economic development.
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Assessment of Existing System
As with Amman, the IDA found that a lack of a reliable water supply system was perhaps
the most pressing challenge to the development of the four areas under consideration. The
population had grown in each area and had outpaced existing water supplies. The targeted towns
had no sizable sources of surface water and the bulk of water supply came from small springs and
deep wells.69 Drought had exacerbated water shortages in recent years and the municipalities had
to resort to rationing supplies or hauling in water by trucks to meet demand, especially in the dry
summer months.70
In Zarqa, the water system was inadequate, unreliable, and subject to sewage contamination
entering the catchment area above spring sources.71 Water quality was low, and the IDA feared the
real possibility of an epidemic of waterborne diseases.72 Rationing was common, especially during
the dry season, and at least two industries had been turned away by the municipality because of its
inability to meet their water needs. 73 With the World Bank’s goal of increasing economic activity,
it is likely that this inability to support industrial activity on the current infrastructure would have
been a significant motivating factor for the IDA’s funding. Most streets had water mains, but they
were undersized for the demand, and resulted in interrupted service and low pressures to its 8,120
metered connections. The municipality reported that around 70% of the population was served by
these connections and the remaining population was believed to be dependent on neighbors for
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water.

74

An estimated 35% of water production failed to generate revenue, either from under

registration of consumer meters or free water given to the Mosques, Churches, or the municipal
government.75
As with Amman and Zarqa, the IDA found that the present water sources in the four
municipalities to be served by the Azraq-Irbid project were insufficient. Irbid, Mafraq, and Ramtha
were partially dependent on trucked water supplies, and Husn was entirely dependent on trucked
supplies when rainwater cisterns became depleted.76 The water distribution systems were limited
in three of the municipalities, while no system existed in Husn. Water quality was unsatisfactory,
largely due to contamination from periodic shutting off of supply and the handling of shipped
water. As a result waterborne diseases were prevalent. Water consumption in the region was very
low, ranging from 7 LPCD to 29 LPCD. 77 In Irbid, authorities estimated around 30% of extracted
water was unaccounted for.78 As with the Amman Water Supply project, the possibility of lost
revenue because of unaccounted for water likely would have been a concern for the IDA.
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Figure 5: 1963 IBRD Map Showing Existing Water Infrastructure and Proposed Infrastructure in
Zarqa79
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Figure 6: 1963 IBRD Map Showing Proposed Azraq-Irbid Water Supply Project80
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Proposed Projects
The Zarqa and Azraq-Irbid projects, as well as the Ramallah-El Bira and Nablus projects,
shared major components. The primary goal would be to open new collection works, build
transmission mains, pumping facilities, reservoirs, and accessory facilities. The project appraisals
evidence that these infrastructure developments would contribute to the World Bank’s goal of
promoting economic development of Jordan, and open new pathways to increase foreign
exchange. All, except Ramallah-El-Bira, included the improvement or expansion of existing
distribution systems.
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For Zarqa, the plan provided funding for the development of a new well

supply, a booster pumping station, a transmission main to the city, and major improvements and
extensions to the distribution system. The present spring supply and pumping facilities were to be
held in reserve.82 Beyond the development of new infrastructure, the project proposed
discontinuing preferential water rates given to schools and hospitals, eliminating free water to the
municipality, and an overall increase in water rates to increase revenues.83 The appraisal
documents do not make any prediction as to how these rate changes would be received, but it is
likely that the discontinuation would have been unpopular. This decision further evidences the
supremacy of revenue generation to the World Bank.
The proposed Azraq-Irbid project was a much more ambitious project than the Zarqa. The
project proposed developing new water supplies for Irbid, Mafraq, Ramtha, and Husn from springs
near Azraq, and utilizing an unused petroleum pipeline to pump the water 137 kilometers
northwest. Funding would be provided for expanding and improving the distributions of Irbid,
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Mafraq, and Ramtha, and the construction of a distribution system in Husn. Provisions were also
made to provide water to a Jordanian air base. Seven desert watering points would be constructed
to provide water supplies primarily to Bedouins in the area. The appraisal notes that due to
“difficulties of tradition” water from these stations would be provided at little or no cost.

84

The

IDA does not indicate the reason for this decision, but this does evidence the Jordanian
government’s influence on the project planning. It is likely that these stations would be run without
concern of revenues to aid in the government’s continued control over the Bedouin groups in this
area. The IDA also projected connecting around 46 villages to the pipeline in the future. As with
the Zarqa project, the IDA project proposed a restructuring of existing water rates, including the
discontinuation of free water to Mosques, Churches, and governments.85 It is notable that these
changes would be implemented despite the decision to provide free water to Bedouin groups along
the transmission lines, possibly speaking to the level of institutional control the Jordanian
government held over the villages as opposed to the bedou areas.
Justification of the Projects
As with the Amman project, the four cities projects were justified along the visions laid
out in the early World Bank plans for the economic development of Jordan. The IDA believed that
the services provided by the projects would substantially relieve chronic water shortages which
had affected living conditions in the towns of Jordan, prevented the improvement of sanitary
conditions, and obligated the municipalities to resort to expensive makeshift solutions during the
periods of peak demand.
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As with Amman, the IDA believe the projects would help reduce
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waterborne diseases and improve public health. Likewise, the IDA justified the investment as it
would facilitate industrial expansion to further the goal of increasing foreign economic exchange.
Evidence of Economic Disincentives to Conservation
As with the Amman Water Supply Project, analyzing the Zarqa and Azraq-Irbid projects
evidences the creation of an economic system with economic disincentives to water conservation.
The IDA’s proposed water rates to be collected by Jordan’s Water Board and the municipalities
were intended to be set high enough to yield revenues sufficient to cover operating expenses,
repayments on long term debt, and normal year to year extensions and a reasonable part of the cost
of future major expansions.
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The IDA envisioned that the projects would be financially self-

liquidating.88 Based on Beecher and Kenny’s assessment of economic disincentives to
conservation in water infrastructure, this would have made it difficult for the Water Board and the
municipal authorities to effectively respond to shortages. In the Zarqa appraisal, the IDA reported
that the pro forma income projections would yield good returns, which would be used to expand
the system. 89 The appraisal predicted that the project would increase the percentage of residents
having their own connections, increasing individual water consumption, and generating larger
revenues for system extensions.90 For the Azraq-Irbid project, the IDA predicted that their
proposed rate structure would encourage greater use of water form the new transmission main,
especially in the early years. 91 Both projects required the borrowers to agree that water rates would
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be maintained, in part, to cover normal extensions and a reasonable part of future expansion.

92

Again, these projects have quite reasonable goals for necessary improvements to the water supply
system, but they create a system where the water authorities and local municipalities would be
vulnerable if there was a decrease in water consumption. The need to maintain revenues for their
expansion sets up a serious economic disincentive to conservation. As water shortages arose,
whether through drought, an uptick in population, or an overall decline in available water sources,
the authorities would not be able to curb water usage lest they operate at a loss-- unable to service
the World Bank loans, expand the system, or maintain existing infrastructure.

3. Second Amman Water Supply Project
The First Amman Water Supply Project in 1961 had been designed to serve the needs of
Amman for twenty-five years until 1985. However, in 1973, just twelve years after the first project,
the Jordanian government requested an additional IDA credit for water infrastructure expansion
and improvements. The original plan had been to use revenues from sales of water to fund
extensions and improvements to the first supply project. Circumstance, however, had changed
significantly since 1961. The first project had been designed to service a projected population of
360,000 in 1972.93 In reality, by 1971, the population of Amman was estimated at 521,000.94 Much
of this rapid population growth can be attributed to the sudden influx of refugees who moved to
the city following the Israeli occupation of the West Bank after the 1967 war.95 As the water system
was no longer sufficient for the city’s needs, the IDA conducted a reconnaissance mission in
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Amman in April 1971, and sent two pre appraisal delegations to Amman and to Aqaba in 1972
and 1973 respectively. Working alongside the Jordanian government and consultants from
Vattenbyggnadsbyrån of Stockholm, they designed a new project and credit to meet the city’s
needs.96
Assessment of Existing System
New boreholes, two pumping stations, two services reservoirs and 40 km of trunk mains
and distribution systems, the bulk of the previous water supply project, had been completed in
1968 (original projection had been 1963).97 A third pumping station for that project suffered from
project delays and had to be re-sited. It was completed in 1972 and was, notably, constructed
underground for “security reasons,” potentially as a result of the 1967 war.98 The IDA reported
that even with the improvements from the 1961 project, water consumption in Amman remained
very low. While the first project had been designed to increase water use from 35 LPCD in 1960
to 50 LPCD in 1972, the IDA estimated that in actuality consumption remained at around 35 LPCD
in 1973.99 This shows that despite the anticipated increase in consumption, the first Amman Water
Supply Project had been unable to meet its supply goals. A significant concern of the first project
had been to decrease unaccounted-for water loss, a key requirement for maintaining and increasing
water revenues. While the first water supply project projected reducing unaccounted-for water loss
from 39% in 1961 to 20% in 1972, the actual rate of loss in 1973 was around 64%.100 This would
have been a significant concern to the IDA, as more than half of Amman’s water resources were
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not generating the revenues necessary to maintain and expand the system or to service the previous
loan. Chronic water shortages remained an issue in the city and around the country. Since the time
of the first project, a sewage system had been built in Amman, however, the IDA noted that the
system was insufficient to meet the demand of the expanded population and largely unhygienic.101
The Amman-Wadi Sir aquifer (Figure 5) remained the most important source of water for
the capital. The first project had constructed additional wells and pumping stations to exploit this
aquifer, and it provided the bulk of Amman’s total water supply. In the second report, the IDA
referenced that another aquifer system had been identified in northern Jordan and that it was under
development.102 While it did not factor into this second project, this new aquifer system could in
the future provide further supply to Amman and reduce the city’s reliance on the Wadi Sir aquifer.
The appraisal also referenced that flowing artesian spring water had been discovered in limestone
rocks near Amman, indicating a possible new source of water to meet the city’s needs. 103
The rapid population growth of the city had forced the government to implement
emergency arrangements. Additional water was pumped from the Wadi Sir aquifer in 1970 to
supply the existing distribution zones and areas outside of the system.104 Soon before the IDA’s
report, the Jordanian government enacted a law creating the Amman Municipal Area Water and
Sewerage Authority (AWSA) to oversee responsibility for the water and sewerage of the city under
the Jordanian Natural Resources Authority (NRA). This decision was made in consultation with
the World Bank, further evidencing the extent of the Bank’s influence over the country.
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Figure 7: 1973 IBRD Map Showing the Amman Water Supply and Sewerage Project
Water Supply Scheme105
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Figure 8: 1973 IBRD Map showing Existing Water Supply and Sewerage Schemes in Jordan106
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Proposed Project
To meet the rapidly growing water needs of the city, the IDA designed a major overhaul
of the existing infrastructure. Such a project was predicted to meet existing and future water needs
and contribute to the World Bank’s goal of stimulating economic development and increasing
foreign exchange. The IDA’s actions would no doubt have been influenced by the World Bank’s
1969 economic report of Jordan which showed the Bank’s significant concerns about economic
stagnation after the 1967 war.107 The second Amman water supply project shares many
characteristics with the original project: resources would go to the construction of new pumping
stations, trunk mains, a reservoir, general system improvements, as well as extensions and
improvements to the water distribution system.108 The IDA projected that the improvements to
the water system would be adequate to meet Amman’s needs until 1982, with an anticipated 5%
annual population growth rate. 109 The plan provided for additional developments that had not been
present in the first Amman Water Supply Project or the Four Cities Water Supply Projects. This
project provided for the construction of new sewer laterals, new service connections and
improvements to existing sewerage facility usage.110 The scheme would install hydrological
equipment to collect data from storm water drainage around the city.
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Additionally, the credit

would provide funding to train Amman Municipal Area Water and Sewerage Authority (AWSA)
staff in administration, operations, and maintenance and leak detection/repair. 112
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The credit agreement also included plans to conduct development studies of Aqaba. Aqaba,
the Kingdom’s only coastal city (325 km south of Amman on the Gulf of Aqaba) had been key in
the World Bank’s vision for economic development in Jordan. 113 Although the credit agreement
was for a water supply project in Amman, the IDA would provide funding for an interdisciplinary
committee in the National Planning Counsel to create a comprehensive design for the development
of the region. The only justification given for this line item was that the Aqaba region had the
potential for tourism and multisectoral development.

114

While largely irrelevant to the goals of

the second Amman Water Supply Project, this evidences the Bank’s increased concern for
development after the 1967 War. Funding development projects in the city would allow for easier
foreign trade and could potentially make up for lost tourism dollars from the loss of Jordanian
control of pilgrimage sites in Jerusalem and the West Bank.
Evidence of Economic Disincentives to Conservation
As with the first Amman Water Supply Project, the second project evidences the World
Bank’s role in creating economic disincentives to conservation. The second project also relied on
the generation of revenues from water sales to expand and improve the water infrastructure of
Amman. While in the 1961 project the construction costs were funded entirely by credit and
government funds, the construction of the 1973 project actually depended on internal cash
generation. The total cost of the second project was estimated at $11.55 million USD, 75% of that
cost would be covered by this loan from the IDA. The remaining cost would be borne by the
Jordanian government and “internal cash generation” from the water supply system.115 In order to
fund this, water rates in the city had already been increased from 10 fils per cubic meter to 75 fils
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per cubic meter in 1972.116 The IDA projected a further increase of 10 fils per cubic meter over
after 1977. The IDA noted that these water rates would bear heavily on the “poorer members of
the community.”117 The AWSA agreed to conduct a study of the water tariff structure before 1974
to assess the suitability of further increases, however, the project was planned with the assumption
that further rate increases would occur. The appraisal does not indicate how the project would be
restructured in the event that the rate changes were found to be unsuitable. It is likely that this
would further increase pressures on the water authority to maintain water revenues through
consumption. These increases were, in the view of the IDA, necessary to not only service the debt
undertaken by the Jordanian government, but also to fund improvements and extensions to the
water system of Amman.118 The appraisal also explicitly discussed their revenue projections from
the system, estimating that the economic rate of return on the water supply component of the
project would be at least 10%.
As with the first Amman water supply project and the four cities water supply projects, this
system pushed by the IDA would create economic disincentives to conservation of water. The
project is, perhaps, unique in illustrating the precarious nature of this economic system. This
second project was largely the product of conflict. As with the first project, Amman had seen rapid
population growth as a result of refugees fleeing Palestine for the eastern bank. While the system
set up by the IDA in the first project was designed to be self-sustaining and self-replicating it was
unable to respond to these surges. The IDA further expressed concerns that the efficiency of tariff
collections had averaged only around 70% in recent years.119 These systems set up economic
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disincentives to water conservation with a goal of funding expansions and maintenance through
revenue generations, but they were unable to do so. Clearly the World Bank could not have
predicted the war that brought about the need for the 1973 project, but this evidences that this
system of economics was insufficient for Jordan’s needs.

4. Secondary Evidence: Hussein Thermal Power Project
The World Bank’s activities in Jordan were not limited to the funding of water supply
projects. The same year as the second Amman water supply project, the IBRD extended credit to
the Kingdom for the Hussein Thermal Power Project. As with its water supplies, Jordan’s energy
supplies were limited. Unlike neighboring countries, it possesses no oil reserves, nor coal or natural
gas. The country’s power problems, however, were not as severe as its water problems. Fuel could
readily be purchased from outside the country as long as funds were available. But while these
troubles were not as dire as Jordan’s water shortages, this project evidences that the World Bank
readily deployed these allegedly self-sustaining methods of expansion of vital infrastructure.
Recognizing the disorganization and limited capacity of the Jordanian electricity sector,
the bank would provide a credit of 50% of the funding for a new power project of the Jordan
Electricity Authority (JEA). The other 50% of the project’s $24.4 million USD cost would be
funded through a loan from the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development.120 The project
would construct a thermal power station at Zarqa with two 33 megawatt steam-electric units and a
12 megawatt gas turbine to provide electricity for the country. Initially, the plan called for the
generated electricity to be sold solely to the Jordanian Electricity Power Company (JEPCO) by the
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JEA to supply energy to the Amman. The plan projected that by 1978 or 1979, the JEA would be
able to begin sales of electricity to the Irbid District Power Company.121
While there are obvious differences between the IDA’s approach to a water project and the
IBRD’s approach to an electricity generation project, the Hussein Thermal Power Project is
evidences the same type of economic disincentives to conservation as the water supply projects.
As with the water supply projects, the IBRD expected that expansion of the electricity system in
Jordan under the JEA would be financed through internal cash generation from electricity sales.122
The credit agreement stipulated that an agreement between the Jordanian government and the JEA
that tariffs would be maintained at a high level to ensure an annual rate of return of at least 9% on
average net fixed assets in operations.123 The agreement likewise stipulated that the JEA would
not incur additional long term debt unless said debt was expected to be covered at least 1.5 times
by its internal net cash generation.124 This would essentially force the authority to maintain
revenues. If there was a need for further financing major expansions, the JEA would have to show
that it could, through internal cash generation alone, service the debt. The JEA would not be able
to encourage reduced consumption without being unable to finance expansions. With the World
Bank’s requirements for internal cash generation and its demand that the JEA avoid incurring
additional debts to fund infrastructure, the Bank set up a system where sales had to continue for
the very existence of the infrastructure.
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5. Secondary Evidence: National Water Supply Project Tunisia
The World Bank’s funding of water supply projects was not limited to Jordan during this
period. The IBRD and IDA worked on development projects around the Middle East and North
Africa, spreading its influence and vision of post-war development across the region. While the
staff appraisal reports for water projects in other states demonstrate that the World Bank tailored
designs to each country’s unique needs, they evidence the bank employed the same economic
principles in each case. These economic principles evidence the creation of disincentives to
conservation across the region. One such project which evidences the creation of these economic
disincentives is the National Water Supply Project of Tunisia.
There are several obvious differences between the water situation in Tunisia and Jordan.
Tunisia was not subject to a massive influx of refugees. Tunisia had been subject to colonization
and control by France rather than Britain, gaining independence in 1956. Many of the larger cities,
especially those with sizable populations of European expat, had prior functioning water
infrastructure. The two countries, however, shared several similarities in the eyes of the Bank.
Both lacked sizable sources of freshwater. Both had concerning levels of population growth. The
water systems in both were sufficient for their respective needs. And, perhaps most importantly,
the World Bank believed that improved water infrastructure was critical for the economic
development of both.
For the National Water Supply Project, the IBRD and the IDA partnered with the
Government of Sweden’s Swedish International Development Association (SIDA). The Bank and
SIDA conducted three joint missions to Tunisia between 1966 and 1968. Based on their findings,
they designed a three fold program to improve the national water system and ensure potable water
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to important regions of the country.125 These three phases of the water supply plan were largely
independent elements, designed to stand alone, but the IBRD, the IDA, and SIDA planned the
financing of the project and generated their projections on the assumption that all three would be
completed as scheduled. The first phase was a group of high priority works to meet the immediate
needs of the country, to be completed between 1968-1973. The second phase, envisioned as a
second project, consisted of future works that had not yet been clearly defined, but was projected
to be ready for execution between 1971-1973. The final phase consisted of a series of minor
improvements and works already underway and financed by the Tunisian government during the
1968-1973 period. The first phase would consist mainly of improvements and expansions of the
supply and distribution systems of the two most populous and economically important regions,
Tunis and the Sahel, as well as the towns of Nabeul and Hammamet which were important for
tourism.126 The Bank noted that after independence in 1956, the Tunisian government had invested
into water supply systems in smaller cities with had been neglected and that an increase in water
sales from this investment was particularly visible in the Sahel and the northern provinces.127 The
Bank further emphasized that to avoid resorting to a costly scheme of desalination to meet the
country’s needs, all known freshwater resources would need to be exploited before 1985. 128
In Jordan, the World Bank financed water projects that were largely creating new systems,
both in the actual water supply and in the management of the supply. In Tunisia, however, a more
robust, existing system already existed. The task for the World Bank and SIDA, then, was
transformation rather than creation. Negotiations for the project were held between the World
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Bank, SIDA and the Tunisian government in 1968. Evidencing the World Bank’s influence, the
Tunisian delegation announced that their government had successfully created the Societe
Nationale d’Exploitation et de Distribution des Eaux (SONEDE), a national water authority. It
would function autonomously from the government, and its administrative and accounting
structures had been prepared by consultants approved by the World Bank. The appraisal evidences
that the systems by which SONEDE would operate would create economic disincentives to water
conservation. As with the Jordanian water supply projects, expansion of the Tunisian system was
dependent on internal cash generation.129 The project had been designed under the assumption that
SONEDE would be able to internally finance its own improvements. The financial details of the
project show that the Bank planned the system to reserve around 35% of its revenues for
infrastructure investments.130 The World Bank anticipated that SONEDE would only have to
borrow further funds for “occasional large projects.”
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These details evidence that the same

economics which created disincentives to water conservation in Jordan were applied across the
region.
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V.

Analysis & Conclusion
These projects show that the World Bank’s involvement in development in the Middle

East during the 1960s and 1970s directly lead to the creation of economic disincentives to water
conservation. The first Amman Water Supply Project shows that the system was created from its
inception in such a way that economic disincentives to water conservation were inevitable, whether
intentionally or inadvertently. The Bank required that revenues be maintained to ensure the system
could maintain and expand itself. These requirements are, of course, reiterated in the subsequent
projects, both in Jordan and outside.
In 1972, a roundtable discussion, Bretton Woods Revisited, was published evaluating the
two major institutions which emerged from the Bretton Woods conference: the IMF and the IBRD.
In his essay, Raymond Mikesell, an economist who served as one of the technical staff of that
conference, assessed “The Emergence of the World Bank as a Development Institution.”132 He
argued that “The World Bank’s operations have not been guided by any particular growth or
development model[…] the Bank has eschewed any identification with target rates of growth or
the achievement of a condition of self-generating growth.”
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The evidence presented in this

project, however, contradicts Miksell’s assessment. The World Bank and its subsidiary
organizations, clearly promoted a model of water supply development that operated on expansion
and maintenance through water revenue generation. This model was not isolated to a single
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country, and it appears from the Hussein Thermal Power Project, that similar models were applied
to other sectors. As both Kenny and Beecher’s research into water management indicate, this
revenue dependant model of expansion and maintenance puts water utilities in a difficult position.
When water scarcity is on the horizon, a utility should be able to respond by encouraging
conservation to ensure demand does not exceed supply. If a utility depends, however, on an
economic system which requires maintained revenues for its survival, they will be unable to
encourage that necessary conservation.
Examining the sources which hint at the World Bank’s motivations, the speeches, the
newsletters, even the reflections of Bretton Woods economists, do not appear to indicate that the
economic model applied to the development of water systems in the Middle East and North Africa
was known to be harmful. Indeed, the project appraisal documents appear to show good will and
intentions on the part of the Bank staff when applying these models of development. This finding
could open up an interesting discussion about the actions of International Organizations and
Western state-sponsored development agencies. The goals of ensuring access to water supplies,
improving public health, promoting economic development to reduce global poverty, are on the
surface noble, though perhaps too optimistic. The purpose of this thesis is not to apply bad-faith
criticism to the actions of the Bank during this period. That being said, it is clear that an unintended
consequence of the organization's development efforts was creating economic disincentives to
water conservation.
As the population of the Middle East and North Africa continue to rise, as water tables
continue to fall, and as climate change exacerbates challenges faced by the region’s peoples, water
solutions must be found. It is likely that these solutions will become increasingly radical in the
years to come. Virtual water importation will likely continue to rise. Desalination will continue to
54

be investigated. Fossil water sources will continue to be drilled. Perhaps open ocean mariculture
will become a viable part of the solution. Regardless of the massive projects the governments of
the Middle East and North Africa undertake, economics will remain a major factor. The solution
to water insecurity in the region will be multifaceted, but states and international organizations
should not neglect a thorough examination of the economic systems which underlie their water
sectors. Water utilities must be able to respond to shortages effectively, and understanding the
factors which disincentivize them from conservation efforts may make their efforts more effective.
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